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1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to test empirically whether interventions by
the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System in the U.S. dollar-
Deutsche Mark spot exchange market were effective during the period from
February 1985 up to August 1988.
After a short description of some aspects of officisl interventions in
foreign exchange markets and a description of three mechanisms through
which intervention can influence the exchange rate in theory ( section 2),
an empirical study is carried out with daily data on interventions by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve ( section 3). With these daily data it
is possible to test whether interventions had an immediate impact on the
dollar-DM exchange rate by altering the market expectations, whether coor-
dinated interventions were more effective than non-coordinated interven-
tions and whether the effectiveness of interventions was determined by
their announcement effect.
2. SOME ASPECTS OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTION
2.1. Definition
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the
early seventies, the exchange value of the major currencies in the indus-
trialized world (for ínstance the U.S. dollar-the Deutsche Mark and the
Japanese yen) is in principle determined by market forces. However, in the
present system of managed floating the exchange rate is not the outcome of
supply and demand by market participants only. The monetary authorities of
many countries have tried to influence the relative value of their curren-
cies frequently by exchange morket inl.erventions.2
An official intervention is a sale or purchase of foreign exchange against
domestic currency, which monetary authorities undertake in the exchange
marketl). According to the Report of the Working Group on exchange market
intervention (1983), interventions in the past have served as a means for
different kinds of objectives, related to both short term and long term
market conditions.
In the short run monetary authorities intervened to 'counter disorderly
market conditions', as indicated by a widening of bid-offer spreads, in-
creasing uncertainty in the market or large intra day exchange rate move-
ments. Under such circumstances official interventions were used to in-
fluence market psychology and to resist exchange rate movements that gain
a momentum of their own (so called 'bandwagon'-effects). Monetary authori-
ties intervened over longer periods to smooth exchange rate movements and
to bring the exchange rate in line with an equilibrium value based on
'fundamentals' (for example inflation, money growth and balance of payment
accounts).
Beside these 'active' interventions to influence the exchange rate direct-
ly, central banks at times intervened on other motives such as to build up
foreign exchange reserves or to carry out customer transactions2). These
customer transactions are purchases or sales of foreign currency under-
taken by a central bank on behalf of for example its government. Although
their ultimate objectives differ, the effect of these 'passive' interven-
tions and the 'active' interventions on the exchange rate may be the same
in practice, if the customer transactions are guided by exchange policy
considerations and if these transactions are timed properly3).
The monetary authorities can intervene in either the spot market or the
forward market. A purchase or sale of foreign curr~ncy in the forward
market will be preferred, if the monetary authorities want to postpone the
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1) This definition is taken from the Report of the Working Group on ex-
change Market Intervention, under the direction of Ph. Jurgensen, March
1983, p. 4. The Working Group was established at the G~ Summit in
Versailles, 3une 1982, to carry out an international study of experience
with intervention among these countries.
2) See the Report of the Working Group (1983), p. 4.
3) In reality,this is the case for the central bank of West-Germany, the
Deutsche Bundesbank. See Gleske (1982) p. 269 and Scholl (1983), p. 121.3
effects of an intervention on the domestic monetary base or money supply.
However, an intervention in the forward market will only affect the cur-
rent spot exchange rate if the opponent of the central bank in the forward
market transaction immediately offsets the exchange risk on the uncovered
forward position in the spot market4).
Finally, a distinction can be made between sterilized and non-sterilized
interventions. Sterilized intervention refers to purchases and sales of
foreign currency whose impact on the home country's money stock is offset
through domestic open-market transactions5). If, for instance, the cen-
ho~.Jc
tra~purchases foreign exchange against domestic currency from commercial
banks in order to support the value of foreign currency, the reserve posi-
tion of the banking sector as a whole increases. As soon as the commercial
banks supply more credit facilities to the public based upon their in-
creased liquidity position, the exchange market intervention results in an
increase of the domestic money supply. If such an increase is not consis-
tent with the central bank's monetary growth objective, the central bank
can sterilize the liquidity effect of the intervention by selling domestic
currency assets to the banking sector, leaving the monetary base un-
changed.
If sterilized interventions have a permanent effect, the monetary authori-
ties are able to realize an exchange rate target independent of a monetary
growth target. If, on the other hand, sterilized interventions are not
effective and non-sterilized (or: partially sterilized) interventions do
affect the exchange rate, the effectiveness of interventions depends pri-
marily on the influence of a change in the money supply on the exchange
rate. In theory both sterilized and non-sterilized interventions may have
a permanent influence on the relative value of a currency through diffe-
rent transmission mechanisms.
4) As far as the central bank deals with a commercial bank in the forward
market, this condition is met because commercial banks are not allowed by
regulation to hold large uncovered positions in exchange markets. See
Gleske (1982), p. 266 and Scholl (1983), p. 121.
5) The definition is quoted from Humpage (1986), p. 2.FIGURE 1. THREE CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTION
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2.2. Three channels of influence6)
Humpage (1986) mentions three different channels through which exchange
market intervention can influence exchange rates: the monetary channel,
the portfolio-adjustment channel and the expectations channel (See figure
1. In the monetary channel an intervention influences the exchange rate if
the effect of the intervention on the relative money supply of both
countries is not completely sterilized. Under this condition a purchase
of foreign exchange by the monetary authorities will result in an in-
crease of the domestic money supply. According to the classical quan-
tity theory of money, an increase of the money supply will result in a
similar increase of the domestic price level. If the exchange rate is
determined by trade flows and purchasing power parity, the domestic
currency will depreciate as a consequence of the rise in the domestic
price level. Although this adjustment process takes time and although
purchasing power parity may not hold, the relative rates of money
growth between different countries are important determinants of
nominal exchange rates and therefore, non-sterilized interventions may
be effective in the long run. Moreover, an intervention may be effec-
tive through the monetary channel in the short run, under the assump-
tion of rational expectations. If, for instance, a purchase of foreign
currency by the domestic central bank is interpreted by the market as a
sign of a future expansionary monetary policy, the domestic currency
will depreciate immediately~).
-------------------------------------------------------
6) This section is based on the more extensive discussion on channels of
influence for interventions by Humpage (1986). Genberg (1981), Loopeskoo
(1984) and Mtiller (1984) also discuss transmission mechanisms of interven-
tions by monetary authorities.
~) See Genberg (1981), p. 454. However it is very risky for the monetary
suthorities to count on this expectations effect of an intervention be-
cause this purchase of foreign currency could also be interpreted as a
temporary easing of monetary conditions and hence could generate expecta-
tions of future monetary contraction. In the last case the intervention
would result in an undesired appreciation of the domestic currency.5
2. A sterilized intervention can be effective through the portfolio-ad-
justment channel under the two assumptions that ( 1) the public holds
both domestic and foreign financiel assets in their portfolios and that
(2) these assets are not perfect substitutes. In this situation inves-
tors will not be indifferent about the currency denomination of the
securities in their portfolios, because of for instance differences in
exchange rate risk, political risk and default risk between domestic
and foreign assets. In order to induce the risk-averse investors to
hold the supply of domestic and foreign assets, equilibrium in the
financial markets results in a risk premium on the more risky ( foreign)
assets. This risk premium equals the nominal interest differential
between foreign and domestic assets plus the expected rate of depre-
ciation of the domestic currency against the foreign currency.
A sterilized intervention can influence the exchange rate by
changing the relative supply of domestic and foreign assets. Suppose
that the monetary suthorities sterilize the expansionary effect of a
purchase of foreign currency on the domestic money supply by an
offsetting sale of domestic securities. This sterilized intervention
results in an excess supply of domestic securities and, in order to
rebalance their portfolios, an excess demand of foreign securities by
the investors. Given the supply of foreign assets, the foreign interest
rate and the expected future spot rate, financial market equilibríum
will be restored by a rise in the domestic interest rate and a
depreciation of the domestic currency ( a rise in the current spot rate)
both leading to a drop in the risk premium on foreign assets. Thus, in
theory monetary authorities can do both realising a monetary growth
objective and an exchange rate objective by sterilizing interventions.
In practice, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized
intervention is weak8j and monetary policy makers themselves have
expressed their doubts on the possibility to exert a significant effect
-------------------------------------------------------
8) See for example Rogoff (1981) and Loopeskoo (1984).6
on exchange rates in the face of persistent market pressures by steri-
lized intervention9). Furthermore, in reality the distinction between
sterilized and non-sterilized intervention becomes fuzzy in the short
run, as central banks do not automatically compensate an intervention
by an offsetting open market operationl0)
3. Finally, monetary authorities can try to influence the exchange rate
through the expectations channel.
If foreign exchange markets were perfectly efficient, all the relevant
information on exchange rate determinants would be aggregated, correct-
ly interpreted and finally processed by the market participants into a
rational expectation for the future spot rate. If no market imperfec-
tions such as transaction costs and capital restrictions existed, the
current spot rate would be consistent with this expectation for the
future spot rate at any moment because of the positions taken by
profit-maximizing speculators and arbitragers in the market. In such a
world central banks would not be able to influence the exchange rate
through interventions, without changing their monetary policies, but,
on the other hand, there would be no need for interventions. Neverthe-
less, in the real world of uncertainty, excessive exchange rate move-
ments, 'bandwagon'-effects, speculative bubbles and market imperfec-
tions, there is a case for official intervention. As soon as the market
does not take account of all the relevant information of 'fundamentals'
or of changes in these exchange rate determinants, central banks can
try to give the market a signal by an intervention. This supposes, how-
ever, that the monetary authorities have a better insight in economic
developments or possess better information than the market. But if the
monetary authorities are able to emphasize neglected information or to
provide new information by intervening, the exchange rate will be
9) See the Report of the Working Group (1983), p. 20. According to the
Working Group an intervention is more effective if it is accompanied by
domestic policy adjustments. By sterilizing an intervention however the
domestic monetary policy remains unchanged.
10) See Schlesinger (1984), p. 81.affected immediately in a highly (although not perfectly) efficient
market.
Thus, it is possible that interventions, whether sterilized or non-
sterilized, affect the exchange rate through the expectations channel.
Although it can be very difficult to change market expectations, the
monetary authorities have intervened frequently on a large scale to
remove perceived market inefficienciesll). The effectiveness of these
interventions will, however, depend on the specific circumstances, the
timing and scale of the intervention, the opinion and determination of
the market as well as on the credibility of the monetary authori-
tiesl2).
3. INTERVENTIONS BY THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
IN THE DOLLAR-DM MARKET
3.1. Specification of the regression equations
In this section an empirical study is undertaken, with daily intervention
data and intraday exchange rate data, into the question whether the Deut-
sche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System have been able to influence
the dollar-DM exchange rate systematically through the expectations chan-
nel from February 1985 up to August 1988. Although the effectiveness of
interventions depends (as is mentioned above) on the specific circumstan-
ces at the moment of the intervention, it makes sense to test for the
systematical effectiveness of interventions, under the assumption that the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve will only intervene when the circum-
stances are favorable to attain their exchange rate objective in the short
run.
11) See the Report of the Working Group (1983), p. 21: 'The authorities in
each of the Summit countries at times undertook large-scale intervention
when they judged that market participants had not taken full account of
fundamental factors...'.
12) See Mayer ~ Taguchi (1983), p. 8.8
This empirical analysis is limited to the spot interventions of the Bun-
desbank and the Federal Reserve in the U.S. dollar-DM marketl3)
Officially, both the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve intervene in the
first place to 'counter disorderly market conditions'. However, the crite-
rium of 'disorderly market conditions' is open to discussion and therefore
compatible with different strategies for intervention. For example, if
disorder is associated with erratic short term exchange rate fluctuations
a policy of 'leaning against the wind' would seem to be appropriate for
intervention. A'leaning against the wind' policy is oriented towards the
actual path of the exchange rate. As soon as the current exchange rate
rises or falls the central bank will sell respectively purchase foreign
exchange in order to smooth excessive exchange rate swings in both direc-
tions.
IF, on the contrary, disorder is associated with an under- or overvalua-
tion of a currency regarding 'fundamentals', the intervention policy will
be oriented towards an equilibrium value of the exchange rate. In this
case a central bank will sell or purchase foreign currency as long as it
is believed to be over- respectively undervalued.
Ex-post it can be inferred from the change in the foreign currency reser-
ves of a central bank during a long period, which policy is followed. If a
'leaning-against the wind' policy is carried out the central bank reserves
will not have changed remarkably: the sales of foreign currency will in
general equal the purchases. If, however, a central bank has tried to
guide the exchange rate to an equilibrium level by interventions, the
foreign currency reserves will change in one direction through either
sales or purchases of foreign exchangel4)
The daily data on interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve
in the dollar-DM exchange market during February 1985 until September 1988
show that interventions were concentrated in specific months and thus that
periods of intervention were alternated by longer periods of non-interven-
tion. Moreover, the interventions in these relatively short periods were
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13) The Bundesbank does not undertake dollar interventions within the EMS.
See Scholl (1982), p. 121. For an empirical analysis of interventions
within the EMS, see Eijffinger (1988).
14) See Lehment (1980), p. 140.9
one-sided (either purchases or sales) with the exceptions of September
1986 and August 198~. In these two months the Bundesbank first sold dol-
lars and later purchased dollars. Thus, it may be concluded that neither
the Bundesbank (although intervening more frequently and for larger
amounts), nor the Federal Reserve intervened only to smooth exchange rate
movements, but also tried to influence the exchange rate (or market senti-
ment) in a specific direction towards an equilibrium valuel5)
Therefore, whatever the ultimate objective and the precise strategy fol-
lowed by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve may be, interventions are
considered to be effective in this study as soon as a purchase (sale) of
dollars results in (1) a rise (fall) of the dollar-DM exchange rate, or in
(2) a deceleration of a downward (upward) movement in the exchange rate.
In the first case the central banks reverse the exchange rate movement and
in the second case they slow down the exchange rate movement by inter-
vening.
Under the assumption of highly efficient markets, effective interventions
will influence the exchange rate movement immediately (i.e. within the
same day) by altering the expectations of market participants. Thus, the
intraday change of the dollar-DM exchange rate can be written as a func-
tion of (inter alia) interventions by the Bundesbank and the Federal
Reserve:
( - ) ( t ) ( 4 )
St - SP - f[0(iDM-iS)t I~DBB INV~ED~ (1)
with: St - the dollar-DM closing rate (ultimo) in Frankfurt on
Sp
t
day t defined as the DM price of one dollar.
- the dollar-DM opening rate (primo) in Frankfurt on the
same day t.
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15) As an example reference can be made to the weeks immediately after the
G5 Plaza Agreement of 22 September 1985. Although the dollar falling
almost without interruption from 26 February 1985 the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve sold dollars, because they meant that the dollar was over-
valued and did not reflect changes in economic conditions. See Cross (Win-
ter 1985-1986), p. 46.10
DM g
0(it -~) - the change in the interest differential between one-
month Euro- DM - and Eurodollar deposits in London
during day t.
INVDBB - spot market interventions by the Bundesbank during day
t defined as purchases of dollars expressed in bil-
lions of DM.
INVtED - spot market interventions by the Federal Reserve
during day t defined as purchases of dollars expres-
sed in billions of
DM16)
Assuming that trade flows adjust slowly and other 'fundamentals' do not
change in short term, the intraday exchange rate movement is explained
primarily by short term capital flows. Supposing that investors balance
their portfolios at every moment, a change in the interest rate differen-
tial will cause imbalances and thus immediately induce an adjustment pro-
cess in the highly efficient financial markets. A relative rise in the DM
interest rate will bring about a demand surplus for DM assets. Given the
supply of DM assets in the short run, portfolio equilibrium will be re-
stored by a fall in the exchange rate ( i.e. an appreciation of DM and a
depreciation of dollar). If the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve are
able to influence the marketsentiment, the exchange rate will rise after
the news of dollarpurchases by the central banks.
Reasoning along the same lines, a smoothing of the exchange rate movements
by interventions of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve can be formal-
ized as follows:
(-) (i) (t)
(Su-Sp) - (Sp-Su- ) - f[e(iDM-i~) INVDBB~ INVFED~
t t t t 1 t' t t
-------------------------------------------------------
(Z)
16) For a description of the data see the appendix.11
By purchasing dollars during the day the central banks may try to retard a
depreciation of the dollar, started during the preceding night
((sp-St-1) ~ (st-sp) ~ 0)1~).
In order to capture both elements of effective interventions, reversing
and slowing down exchange rate movements, the empirically estimated equa-
tion is chosen to be of an unrestricted form:
( 4 ) ( - ) ( - ) ( t ) ( t )
St - a0 a 81St } a2St-1 } a3~(iDM-i~)t , a41NVDBB } aSINV~ED (3)
According to the discussion above, the estimates are expected to yield
positive values for the opening rate coefficient (al) and the intervention
coefficients (a4, a5) and negative values for the lagged closing rate
coefficient (a2) and the interest coefficient (a3). Because the effective-
ness of interventions does not only depend on the volume of dollar pur-
chases or sales18), but also on other circumstances, the empirical analy-
sis is extended with two other equations.
In the first place it is generally supposed that coordinated interventions
of both central banks are more effective than non-coordinated interven-
tions by either the Bundesbank or the Federal Reservel9). The reason for a
difference in their effectiveness is that coordínated interventions are
1~) By chosing the U.S. dollar-DM opening and closing rates in Frankfurt,
a 24-hour day can be divided in two segments: the European segment (the
day) and the non-European segment (the night). The assumption has been
made that Federal Reserve interventions in the dollar-DM market take place
during the European segment of the day.
18) See Scholl (1983), p. 121: 'In some situations even small intervention
amounts may suffíce to slow down or even reverse an undesirable exchange
rate movement. In other situations even large intervention amounts may
have the opposite effect ...'.
19) See for instance Ohr (1985), p. 211 and the Report of the Working
Group (1983), p. 26: 'closely coordinated action had at times been more
effective than intervention by only one central bank'. Loopeskoo (1984),
p. 268-2~o finds some empirical evidence that active coordinated German-
U.S. intervention had a different impact on exchange rates than non-
coordinated interventions, but she cannot confirm whether coordinated
interventions had a stronger impact than non-coordinated interventions.12
interpreted by the market as a strong signal that both monetary authori-
ties have adopted the same exchange rate objective and are determined to
reach this objective even by adjusting their policies.
If the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve intervene on the same day, these
interventions are closely coordinated by a concertation procedure. The
daily data can therefore be divided in three non-overlapping categories:
coordinated interventions by both central banks ( CINVt), non-coordinated
interventions by the Bundesbank ( NCINVDBB) and non-coordinated interven-
t
tion by the Federal Reserve (NCINVtED). The resulting regression equation
can be written as:
( t ) ( - ) ( - ) ( t ) ( 4 )
St - a0 } 81St } a2St-1 } a3e(iDM-i~)t t a4CINVt ~ a5NCINVDBB
(4)
f s6NCINVtED (4)
If the hypothesis that coordinated interventions are more effective is
correct, the coordination coefficient (a4) will come out positive and more
significant than the non-coordination coefficients (a5, a6).
The second adaptation of the original regression equation (3) is based on
Humpage (1988). In an highly efficient market the effectiveness of an
intervention through the expectations channel depends primarily on the
information content of the intervention for the market participants.
Humpage (1988) distinguishes 'initial' and 'subsequent' interventions. An
initial intervention is defined as an official transaction after a period
of a few days without interventions. Humpage (1988) argues that the an-
nouncement effect and thus the news content of initial interventions is
larger than the news content of the subsequent interventions, falling
within a few days after the initial interventions. Thus, the effectiveness13
of initial interventions is expected to be higher than the effectiveness
of subsequent interventions20).
If initial interventions are defined arbitrarily as an official trans-
action after three business days without interventions2i), the daily in-
tervention data can be split up into initial and subsequent interventions
by the Bundesbank (IINVDBB respectively SINVDBB) and inítial and sub-
sequent interventions by the Federal Reserve (IINVtED respectively
SINVtED):
(') (-) (-) (t) (t)
St - a0 { a1St } a2St-1 ~
a3A(iDM-i~)t t e~IINVDBB t aSSINVDBB
.
4 a61INVtED t a.~SINVtED (5)
If initial interventions are more effective than subsequent interventions
through their announcement effect, the initial coefficients (a4, a6) will
be positive and more significant than the subsequent coefficients (a5,
a7).
3.2. Empirical Results
The regression equations are estimated, due to the availability of intra-
day data for the dollar-DM exchange rate for the period February 1985 up
to August 1988. During this period the dollar fell with interruptions from
20) Humpage (1988) tests this hypothesis for three short period~ of in-
tervention by the Federal Reserve. The results are mixed and he concludes
inter alia that intervention can have a temporary announcement effect, but
this effect is not universal in all periods and is short-lived.
21) Humpage's investigation (1988) differs from this study in some res-
pects: (1) he does not dispose of the amounts of official interventions
but constructs dummy variables for Federal Reserve interventions, (2) he
does not include interventions by the Bundesbank in the dollar-DM market,
(3) he chooses relatively short periods and defines initial interventions
as official transactions after five business days with no intervention. In
order ~ dispose of more observations for initial interventions, we have
chosen longer periods and defined initial intervention as official trans-
actions after three business days with no intervention.TABLE 1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE DOLLAR-DM EXCHANGE MARKET
E
(OLS)ion
u } St - a0
a Sp 4 a Su t a ~ DM ~ t





Period a0 al a2 a a4 a R2 R2 DW LM
Febr.-June -0,0063 0,9037 w 0,0988 -2,0196 0,0196 ~, -0,0606 0,9610 0,9589 2,0786 0,2560
1985 (-0,089) (8.650) (0,948) (-0,678) (2,741) (-1,188)
July-Dec. 0,0234 1,0812 „ -0,0901 -1,1928 0,0079 - 0.9901 0,9897 2,1570 0,8232
1985 (0,928) (13,378) (-1,120) (-0.841) (0,398)
Jan.-June 0,0472 1,0189 „ -0,0400 -1,5660 0,0769 - 0,9806 0,9799 1,8404 0,8099
1986 (1,573) (i4,279) (-0.560) (-1,286) (1,278)
July-Dec. 0,0030 0,9340 „ 0,0639 0,1061 0,0022 - 0,9778 0,9770 1,8286 0,8570
1986 (0,108) (11,244) (0,782) (0,164) (0,385)
Jan.-June 0,2308„ 1,0101 „ -0,1327 „ 0,2672 -0,0057 0,0142 0,9302 0,9271 1,7659 1,6013
1987 (3,724) (13,381) (-1,702) (1.462) (-0,556) (0,636)
July-Dec. 0,0281,~ 1,0433 M -0,0591 0,6620,~ -0,0090 -0,0077 0,9952 0,9950 2,2274 1,7333
1987 (2.277) (14,681) (-0,823) (2.335) (-1,390) (-1.443)
Jan.-June 0,0520 0,8605 „ 0,1096 0,6745 -0,0135 0,0196 0,9585 0,9567 1,7928 0,5869
1988 (1,177) (7,522) (0.901) (0,839) (-1.507) (1,543)
July-Aug. 0,2449„ 1,1519 „ -0,2821 -0,7297 -0,0004 0,0062 0,9024 0,8892 2,2392 1,0305
1988 (2.364) (6,910) (-1,607) (-0,531) (-0,065) (0,918)
Note: t-values within brackets
'- statistically significant at a 5x level
R2 - squared multiple correlation coefficient, adjusted for degrees of freedom
LM - Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation; critical value test statistic
3,84 (a - 0.05)14
its maximum level of DM 3,4~20 on 26 February 1985 to its minimum level of
DM 1,5~85 on 31 December 198~ and recovered later to DM 1,8~92 on 31
August 1988. These exchange rate movements indicate many important deve-
lopments during these years, for instance the growing instability of fi-
nancial markets, the persistent balance of payments disequilibris between
the United States, Japan and Europe, a changing attitude of the U.S, gov-
ernment from 'benign neglect' towards a more 'active' exchange rate policy
and the first efforts for international coordination of fiscal and mone-
tary policies among the major industrialized countries22). As a conse-
quence of the use of daily data, the regressions cannot possibly include
these more fundamental developments, because of their sticl~ess on a daily
base. Instead the estimates are performed for eight subperiods of in prin-
ciple six months~3), under the assumption that changes in fundamentals
proceed slowly and not within a few days24). Therefore, the influence of
'fundamentals' may be reflected in a positive or negative constant (a0).
Table 1 gives the results for the first regression equation (3), including
the amounts of intervention by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve.
As can be seen in the table the constant (a0) is positive and significant
in three periods. The opening rate coefficient (al) is in all cases sig-
nificantly positive and close to one, as expected. On the contrary, the
lagged closing rate does not contribute significantly to the explanation
of the current closing rate in seven cases. In addition, the four positive
(of which one significant) values for the interest rate coefficient (a3)
are a rather counterintuitive results; apparently capital flows are influ-
enced by other factors and cannot be captured by a change in the short
term interest differential between both countries on a daily base.
22) For a discussion of the origins, the historical background and pos-
sible solutions for these worldwide imbalances, see Sijben (1989).
23) With the exception of the first subperiod of five months and the last
subperiod of two months; See appendix.
24) Besides the purpose of this article is not as much to explain the
exchange rate developments as well to test whether official interventions
had an immediate impact on the exchange rate.15
The results on the effectiveness of intervention by the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve in table 1 are somewhat disappointing. Only in the first
half of 1985 the intervention coefficient (a~) is significantly positive
and thus the interventions of the Bundesbank were effective. By selling
dollars in sometimes very large amounts during February and the beginning
of March the Bundesbank was able to cause a sharp decline in the value of
the dollar. As soon as a more negative marketsentiment towards the dollar
was established in March 1985 as a result of troubles in the Ohio thrift
industry and of the slowing U.S. economic growth, the Bundesbank and the
Federal Reserve did not intervene despite considerable uncertainty in the
dollar-DM exchange market, reflected by sharp daily exchange rate move-
ments and wider bid-offer spreads. Nor did they intervene when the dollar
firmed late in April and was traded relatively steadily through the end of
June25)
According to our data, the Federal Reserve did not actively intervene in
the dollar-DM market from the second half of 1985 until the first half of
1987. There is some evidence for effective interventions by the Bundesbank
in the first half of 1986 and by the Federal Reserve in the first half of
1988. However, in the last four periods the intervention coefficients,
although not significantly different from zero, have sometimes a negative
sign suggesting that interventions may have been counterproductive. In
these four periods the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve both purchased
dollars (especially during the last three months of 1987, after the stock
market crash of October 1987) and sold dollars (especially during June,
July and August 1988) in order to stabilize the dollar after the Louvre
agreement of 22 February 198726). Despite frequent reaffirmations of their
commitment to exchange rate stability and despite frequent interventions,
both central banks do not appear to have been able to counter the downward
pressure on the dollar in the last months of 1987 and the upward pressure
-------------------------------------------------------
25) See Cross (Summer, 1985). P. 59 and Cross (Autumn, 1985). P. 53.
26) On 22 February 1987 the monetary authorities of the G~ countries
(except Italy) agreed on closer cooperation to foster stability of ex-
change rates around the levels at the time of the Louvre Summit. See
Funabashi (1988), p. 181-182.16
on the dollar in the summer of 1988. An explanation for the ineffective-
ness of the interventions in these periods may be that the exchange rate
path implied by the official interventions was the opposite of the market
expectations on the future course of the exchange rate, based on the mar-
ket interpretation of changing 'fundamentals' and on perceived policy
changes27).
The frequently changing market sentiment in these last four periods indi-
cates a high degree of uncertainty among the market participants. In such
an environment public statements by policy makers and the announcement of
specific economic indicators (for instance the monthly announcements of
the U.S. trade balance- and the U.S. economic growth-figures) can cause
sharp exchange rate movements. Because these extreme exchange rate fluc-
tuations could influence the estimation results, the regression equation
(3) is extended with dummy-variables (TD1 to TD6) for the monthly an-
nouncements of the U.S. trade balance-figure:
(}) (-) (-) (t) Ít)
u p u DM ~ DBB FED
s - a t a S t a S t a o(i - i ) t a INV t a INV
t o 1 t 2 t-1 3 t 4 t 5 t
t b1TD1 t b2TD2 { b3TD3 t b4TD4 t b5TD5 t b6TD6 (6)
The signs of the trade dummy coefficients (bl to b6) will depend on the
news content of the announcements: if the U.S. trade deficit is smaller or
27) The bearish market sentiment after the stock market crash was caused
by doubts in the markets whether the monetary authorities of the G7 coun-
tries would maintain exchange rate stability and international coordina-
tion as important policy objectives, by disappointing outcomes of the U.S.
budget reduction negotiations and by pessimistic growth perspectives after
the crash. See Cross (Winter 1987-'88), p. 54-56. The bullish marketsen-
timent on the dollar during the summer of 1988 was a result of the buoyant
U.S. economic growth, market expectations of a tighter US monetary policy
and the announcement of a much smaller-than-expected US trade deficit in
June and July. See Cross (Summer 1988).TABLE 2. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE DOLLAR-DM EXCHANGE M.4RKET. ADJUSTED FOR EX-
CHANGE RATE SHOCKS AFTER NEWS Oti THE U.S. TRADE BALANCE
Equation
(OLS)
St- e0~ a1St~ 82St-1~ a3(iDM-iS)t~ fl41~DBB~ ~I~FED~ biTDi~ b2TD2~ b3TD3~b4TD4~b5TD5~b6TD6
Period e a e s a a b b b b b b R2 R2 DW LM






(8,393) (1.222) (-0,941) (2,855) (-1.096) (-2,041) (-0,517) (0.765) (-0,700) (-i,z7z) (-1,185)
July-Dec. 0 0272 1,1169 . -01272 -1,143 0,0078 - 0,0193 0,0071 -0,0118 -0,0147 0,0138 0,0046 0.9903 0.9895 2.1616 0,8686
1985
,
(1.039) (12.981) (-1.481) (-0.777) (0.382) (1.184) (0.453) (0.746) (-0.939) (0.009) (o.z9o)







(-0,481) (-1,123) (1.212) 1-0.798) (-0,290) (o,22z) (-0,766) (0,83z) (-0,475)





(12,028) (0,373) (0,446) (0,418) (-0,720) (-2,193) (0,268) (3.186) (0,203) (-o,8oz)








0.9513 0,9468 1,6187 4.2338
1987 (3.769) (13.736) (-0,645) (2,325) (-o,i74) (0.77i) (6,301) ) (0.33 , . ,





(17.627) (-1.141) (z.5oo) (-1.402) (-1.328) (-3.719) (-3.583) (-1,256) (-z.350) (z.389) (-4,169)








(1.058) (1.303) (o.z81) (1.944) (8.036) (2.708) (1.450) (-4.647) (2.580) (3,84z1
July-Aug. 0,2096~ 1,1328 ~ -0,2438 -0.7736 0,0017 0,0071 0,0205~ -0,0152 „ - - - - 0.9225 0,9070 1,9875 0.0063
1988 (2.192) (7.402) (-1.510) (-0,607) (0,330) (1,130) (2,412) (-1,i87)
Note: See Teble 1. t-values within brackets




St - a0 t a1SP t a2St-1 t a3~ DM ~ (i -i )t t DBB FED a4CINVt t aSNCINVt 4 a6NCINVt
Period a a a a a a a R2 R2 DW LM
Febr.-June -0,0183 0,8926 „ 0,1139 -3.4800 0,0219t -0,0068 - 0,9625 0,9605 2,1083 0,5315 1985 (-0,265) (8,695) (1,111) (-1,188) (3,268) (-0,665)
July-Dec. See table 1, no interventions by the FED-reserve
1985
Jan.-June See table 1, idem
1986
July-Dec. See table 1, idem
1986
Jan.-June 0,1656„ 0,9445 „ -0,0352 1,7800„ 0,0066 -0,0022 0,0077 0,9320 0,9283 1,7791 1,2570
1987 (3,763) (11.582) (-0,424) (2,264) (0,516) (-0,218) (0,500)
July-Dec. 0,0260„ 1,0293 „ -0,0440 0,6698,~ -0,0081 N -0,0012 0,0016 0,9952 0,9950 2,2411 1,9765
1987 (1,997) (14.540) (-0,614) (2,376) (-2,851) (-1,267) (0,577)
Jan.-June 0,0550 0,8437 „ 0,1246 0,3212 0,0023„ -0,0032 „ -0,0044 0,9604 0,9584 1,8466 0,1807
1988 (1.353) (7,565) (1,064) (0,401) (2,754) (-2,817) (-0,188)
July-Aug. 0,2939M 1,1341 „ -0,2904 -0,4982 0,0026 0,0083 -0,0013 0,9026 0,8864 2,3616 2,2340
1988 (2,877) (6,406) (-1,564) (-0,332) (0,877) (0.797) (-0.093)
See note table 1, t-values within brackets
~- statistically significant at a 5z-levellarger than expected, the announcement will result in an appreciation
respectively a depreciation of the dollar28).
Table 2 presents the estimates for the modified regression equation (6),
including the effects of the monthly announcements of the U.S. trade
balance. Two conclusions can be drawn from this table. Firstly, the news
on the U.S. trade balance had more often a significant impact on the
exchange rate in the last two years, as the attention of the market
participants focused on the worldwide balance of payments disequilibria.
Secondly, the interventions by the Federal Reserve turn out to have had a
significant influence on the exchange rate in the first half of 1988 and
the intervention coefficient of the Bundesbank (a4), although not
statistically significant changes from a negative sign (in table 1) to an
expected positive sign in both subperiods of 1988. A closer inspection of
the data reveals that dollarpurchases by both central banks after
disappointing news on the U.S. trade deficit in April 1988 were not
effective, that is, the dollar dropped with 1,6 per cent in Frankfurt the
day of the announcement. The reverse case held in June and July of 1988;
dollarsales of the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve were accompanied by
a rise in the value of the dollar as a result of the announcement of a
smaller than expected U.S. trade deficit. This result may suggest that
interventions are less effective in countering sharp exchange rate
movements after announcements of economic indicators, which are important
determinants for the market expectations~9).
Table 3 comprises the estimates for the regression equation (4), where a
distinction was made between coordinated and non-coordinated intervention.
The results give some supp~ort to the hypothesis that coordinated inter-
ventions are more effective in influencing the exchange rate. In all
periods under review non-coordinated intervention by either the Bundesbank
or the Federal Reserve did not have an immediate significant positive
28) The news-content of the U.S. trade deficit announcements in the period
February 1985-August 1988 is summarized in the Appendix.
29) Such a conclusion is however hard to prove, because of the methodolo-
gical issue that the ex-post exchange rate change includes the effect of
interventions. Without the interventions the exchange rate change might
have been larger as a result of the announcement.TABLE 4. THE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE DOLLAR-DM EXCHANGE MARKET
Equation
(OLS)
St - a0 t
p u








Period a a a a a a a R2 R2 DW LM
Febr.-June -0,0123 0,8481 ,~ 0,1560 -3,1142 0,0424„ -0,0074 -0,0491 -0,0101 0,9678 0,9653 2,0174 0,0337
1985 (-0.190) (8,732) (1,611) (-1,140) (4.736) (-0.805) (-0,697) (-0,~24)
July-Dec. 0,0252 1,0995 „ -0,1090 -1,1886 0,0793 -0,0004 - - 0,9902 0,9898 2,1439 0,6888
1985 (1,002) (13,460) (-1,339) (-0,841) (1,402) (-0,021)
Jan.-June See table 1, the Deutsche Bundesbank intervenes just once
1986 the Federal Reserve does not intervene in this period
July-Dec. -0,0028 0,9739 . 0,0268 0,0779 0,2994w 0,0017 - - 0,9789 0,9780 1,7843 1,4145
1986 (-o,~oo) (1~,755) (0,330) (0,123) (2.529) (0.297)
Jan.-June 0,2318„ 1,0099 „ -0,1331 „ 0,2658 -0,0075 -0,0040 0,0153 - 0.9302 0,9265 1,7621 1,6486
1987 (3,708) (13,322) (-1,700) (1,447) (-o,5i8) (-0.273) (0.656)
July-Dec. 0,0292„ 1,0400 „ -0,0565 0,6338N -0,0138 -0,0052 -0,0170 -0,0087 0,9952 0,9950 2,2154 1,5691
1987 (2.285) (14.394) (-0.774) (2.211) (-~,2~1) (-0,682) (-1,20~) (-1,535)
Jan.-June 0,0373 0.8591 ~, 0,1199 0,4361 -0,1088 , -0,0040 0,0145 0,0168 0,9626 0,9603 1,8340 0,1935
1988 (0,838) (7.816) (1,019) (0.564) (-3,836) (-0.393) (0,7000) (1,229)
July-Aug. 0,2273„ 1,~355 „ -0,257 -0,898 -0,0441 -0,0018 0,0217 0,0047 0,9102 0,8923 2,0326 0,0781
1988 (2,169) (6,078) (-1,351) (-0,648) (-1,136) (-0,305) (1,358) (0,686)
Note: See Table 1. t-values within brackets
"- statistically significant at a 5X-level18
impact on the exchange rate. In contrast, coordinated interventions in-
fluenced the exchange rate immedíately, as expected, in the first half of
1985 and 1988.
Although the volume of intervention by the Bundesbank exceeded the volume
of intervention by the Federal Reserve more than five times in February
and March 1985, a comparison between the coordination coefficient (a4) and
the non-coordination coefficient of the Bundesbank (a5) suggests that
above all the coordinated interventions with the Federal Reserve were
effective in changing the rise of the dollar in the last week of February
into a decline30). The same conclusion can be drawn for the coordinated
dollar purchases of both central banks in January 1988, which provided a
clear signal to the market that the monetary authorities were committed to
the G7 statement of 22 December 1987 (the so-called Telephone-Accord),
that a further decline of the dollar could be counterproductive by dama-
ging growth prospects in the world economy3l). On the contrary, the signi-
ficant negative coordination coefficient (a4) in the second half of 1987
presents a rather counter intuitive result; although the Bundesbank and
the Federal Reserve coordinated interventions frequently, they were ap-
parently not able to counter the dollar's decline after the stock market
crash in October 1987 up to December 1987.
Finally, Table 4 presents the estimates for regression equation (5) with
the distinction between initial and subsequent interventions by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve.
The results indicate the exístence of an important announcement effect of
initial interventions by the Bundesbank in the first half of 1985 and the
second half of 1986. Besides, there is some evidence for effective initial
interventions by the Bundesbank in the second half of 1985 and by the
Federal Reserve in July and August 1988. The unexpected negative sign of
the initial coefficient (a4) for the Bundesbank in the first half of 1988
30) In this respect the positive and significant intervention coefficient
for the Bundesbank and the negative but insignificant intervention coeffi-
cient for the Federal Reserve during the first half of 1985 on Table 1 may
lead to wrong conclusions.
31) See Cross ( Winter 1987-'88). P. 57.19
is due to an intervention after disappointing news on the U.S. trade defi-
cit in April 1988. This suggests that even the announcement effect of an
initial intervention does not outweigh news on more fundamental economic
developments for the market. The estimates provide no evidence for a dif-
ference in effectiveness between initial and subsequent interventions by
the Federal Reserve. This result may be explained by the fact that the
Federal Reserve intervenes in all subperiods less than the Bundesbank. As
the Federal Reserve does not intervene frequently, the difference in the
announcement effect between initial and subsequent intervention for the
market may be small.
4. CONCLUSION
Officially, the Deutsche Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System inter-
vene in the foreign exchange market actively to counter disorderly market
conditions. In the period between February 1985 up to August 1988 daily
interventions may, however, have served other purposes, for ínstance
lowering the dollar after the Plaza Summit and stabilizing the dollar
after the Louvre Summit. Whatever their precise objective, exchange market
interventions can affect the exchange rate through the expectations chan-
nel in theory. If an intervention provides the market with new information
or a signal about the future course of the exchange rate or of monetary
policy and if the market is highly efficient, the exchange rate will im-
mediately change after the intervention.
Our empirical analysis, on the contrary, suggests that in practice the
effectiveness of exchange market intervention is limited in the sense that
much depends on the specific circumstances under which the monetary
authorities intervene. Our results suggest that interventions to counter
market pressures, which resulted through changes in market expectations
based on 'fundamentals', were not effective. However, this conclusion has
to be handled carefully, because of the unsettled methodological problem
that the exchange rate movements might have been more pronounced without
the interventions.
Part of the ineffectiveness of interventions may reflect the difficulty
for the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve to counter sharp exchange ratezo
changes following important news for the market, such as the monthly an-
nouncements of the U.S. trade balance figure. The effect of unexpected
changes in these economic indicators on the market expectations apparently
exceeds the effect of news on interventions by both central banks.
Nevertheless, intervention can have an important effect on the exchange
rate, especially when the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve undertake a
concerted action. Our results indicate that coordinated interventions were
more effective than non-coordinated interventions. Thus, i~ appears that
the market interprets a coordinated intervention as an important signal
that both monetary authorities are determined to change the exchange rate.
Finally, interventions may have an important announcement effect after a
period of no intervention. According to our results initial interventions
by the Bundesbank were more effective than subsequent interventions. In
order to attain an important announcement effect, a selective intervention
strategy and a careful timing of the interventions therefore seems to be
very important.21
APPENDIX: DATA DESCRIPTION
The opening and closing exchange rates are rates in Frankfurt and were
taken from the Statistische Beihefte zu den Monatsberichten der Deutschen
Bundesbank, Reihe 5, Tabelle 6: Kassakurse des US-dollar in Tagesverlauf.
The opening and closing rates are published from February 1985. The rates
are the DM price of one dollar. The interest rates are one month Eurodol-
lar- and EuroDM-closing rates in London. Eurorates were preferred above
domestic rates, because Eurodeposito's are close substitutes.
The daily intervention data were kindly provided by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank and concern active interventions in the U.S. dollar-DM market by the
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System, expressed in billions of DM.
However, interventions by the Federal Reserve were only listFd as far as
these interventions resulted in a change of the net foreign currency
reserves of the Bundesbank. The data were available until September 1988.
The dummy-variables for the announcement-effect of the monthly publication
of the U.S. trade balance figure have been constructed carefully using the
Dutch financial newspaper 'Het Financieele Dagblad'. The Following table
indicates the news-content of the announcements and thus their expected
effect on the excange rate:
m
y i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lo ii 12
19851 ~ - - - - - - - t ; - - -
~986 - t - - - - - - , t t -
1987 t - NA2 ~ - o ; - - - - } -
1988 4 t t - 4 t t -22
Note: The U.S. trade deficit figure was smaller-than-expected (t) or lar-
ger-than-expected (-) or as expected (o).
1) In 1985 the pattern of U.S. trade deficit announcements differs
somewhat from the more regular monthly pattern in the other periods.
2) In March 1987 there was no announcement as the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment decided to release the monthly reports about two weeks later,
half April.
A comparison of this table and Table 2 leads to the conclusion that when-
ever the U.S. trade balance-figure announcement had a significant impact
on the exchange rate, the sign corresponds to the expected sign in this
table.23
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